A Social Process in Science and its Content in a Simulation Program

We lay open a position concerning the difference between scientific processes and processes in science. Not all processes in science are scientific. This leads into the center of social simulation. More scientific theories should be incorporated in social simulations, and this should lead to more united structural approaches.Social Simulation, Process, Science, Theory, Social Science, Philosophy of Science

A logical reconstruction of pure exchange economics

The basic core of the theory of exchange is reconstructed in set-theoretical terms. The central notions of the models are the following: person, kind of good, total endowment of goods, endowment of persons, price, equilibrium and utility. All these notions are used in the central hypothese of maximization of utility. Some simple standard theorems and some special hypotheses are formulated concisely. The theory is described in the structuralistic frame of (Sneed, 1971). The notions of utility and equilibrium are treated as theoretical terms relative to the theoryof pure exchange economics

Exchange versus influence: a case of idealization

The intertheoretical relation between economic equilibrium theory and a theory of social institutions is studied in reduced form, i.e. by comparing the central primitives rather than the full formal models. It is shown that equilibrium can be regarded as a limit of institutions with ever more symmetrical power relations. Economic equilibrium theory thus is shown to be an idealization of the theory of social institutions. A provisionary topology which gives substance to the notion of a limit is defined "internally", i.e. by reference to items occurring in the models only. The meta-scientific status of idealization is briefly discussed

A basic model for social institutions

A precise model of social institutions is described comprising four dimensions: first, a macro-level of groups, types of actions, and related notions, second, a micro-level of underlying individuals and actions, together with suitable relations of intention, causal belief and power. Power is characterized in a new way emending proposals discussed recently. Third, the model contains intellectual representations of items on the macro- and micro-level. Fourth, it contains a dimension including the origin and development of what we call "social practices" (smallest units of socially relevant behaviour) which gives the model some historical depth. By putting all these items together, a powerful model with a wide range of applications is created. The claim associated with this model is that it applies to all social institutions which are similar to systems listed up in the introduction. The way of applying the model is discussed in detail on the basis of an abstract example

Game theory and power theory: a critical comparison

Social actions can be formulated in the frame of game theory or in a frame using, and foccussing on, the notion of power. The two frames are described and clarified. The comparison of theories from these two branches are evaluated from the point of theory of science

A theory of power in small groups

A theory of power inspired by Wartenberg's account is presented in precise terms, together with various specializations amounting to different forms of power, and performing a net. The notion of exerting power is characterized by the actors' intentions and by a believed causal connection between the actions involved. The subordinate agent performs "his" action although originally he did not intend to do so. Some variants of application of the models are discussed

The proper reconstruction of exchange economics

This article emends the distinction between T-theoretical and non-T-theoretical terms of a theory T used in the theory of pure exchange economics: PEE (Balzer, 1982). In this former article utilityand equilibrium were treated as PEE-theoretical terms. In this paper the meta-theoretical position of utility is changed. Utility is replaced by price. This change is, on the one hand, supported by arguments from the structuralistic theory of theories, on the other hand, this change has central implications for the structuralistic meta-theory